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1. Introduction 
Is de-extinction unnatural? The answer, clearly, is yes. At the very least, de-extinct creatures 
will be unnatural in their mode of creation, there being a clear difference between the 
evolutionary process and the technological processes that could be used to recreate extinct 
species. It is, I suggest, even probable that de-extinct animals will be unnatural in their physical 
constitution, since de-extinction methods are unlikely to be able to bring back exactly what has 
been lost.1 For example, even if a de-extinct ‘mammoth’ had precisely the same genetic make-
up as some ancient mammoth, the ecological system and epigenetic factors that influence the 
appearance, physiology and behaviour of the two mammoths would almost certainly differ (see, 
for example, Heard and Martienssen.)   
 According to Kurt Bayertz, ‘“naturalness” is intuitively regarded as a value by most 
people’ (133). Combining DNA through artificial insemination and in vitro fertilisation has been 
criticized as being ‘unnatural’. Tuija Takala writes that ‘[even] those who come from a 
philosophical background can catch themselves thinking, “That is unnatural!” and finding 
grounds for suspicion from the thought’ (15). Since unnaturalness is commonly deemed a bad 
thing and since de-extinction is manifestly unnatural, it will be little surprise that a common 
objection to de-extinction is that it is unnatural, and therefore bad. This objection, which I will 
call the ‘unnaturalness objection’, appears in various forms in the writings of such authors as 
Anne Chapman, M.R. O’Connor, Gregory Pence, Ronald Sandler, Mark Sheehan and Takala. 
This paper critically evaluates the unnaturalness objection to de-extinction.  
Section 2 briefly outlines three de-extinction techniques. Sections 3, 4 and 5 consider 
three counterarguments to the unnaturalness objection and show that none of them is 
persuasive. Section 3 evaluates the argument that de-extinction cannot be criticised for being 
unnatural because everything humans do is natural. Section 4 considers the argument that 
criticisms based on unnaturalness are unconvincing because naturalness is a social construct. 
Section 5 explains why claims that the naturalness of an action affects the ethical status of that 
action are commonly dismissed for failing to distinguish between facts and values, and how the 
unnaturalness objection to de-extinction can avoid such objections. Section 6 considers ethical 
objections to the unnaturalness of de-extinction based on deontological concerns, in particular 
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arguments that refer to integrity and disgust. Section 7 considers objections to de-extinction 
based on consequentialist considerations, responding that these may be resolvable through 
research into ecological systems, limiting risky activities, and limiting the use of de-extinction 
practices when their consequences are unclear. Section 8 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Three Commonly Proposed De-Extinction Techniques 
The – arguably – least technologically invasive approach to de-extinction involves so-called 
‘back-breeding’: the selective breeding of members of an existing species that retains some of 
the genes of an extinct species to create organisms that resemble the extinct species. Using this 
technique, the Tauros research team is selectively breeding cattle to recreate animals resembling 
aurochs, the ancestor of today’s cattle pictured in early cave drawings (The TaurOs 
Programme). The same technique is being used to try to produce an Abingdon Island giant 
tortoise from tortoises identified as having an overlapping genome (O'Connor 57). 
Technology’s role in this practice is limited to identifying the genes of the lost species, finding 
living individuals with a similar genome, and guiding the selective breeding programme.  
A second de-extinction technique involves somatic cell nuclear transfer, a form of 
cloning. A nucleus from the cryogenically preserved cells of an extinct species is inserted into an 
egg cell provided by a member of a closely related species (Ogura, Inoue and Wakayama; 
Richmond, Sinding and Gilbert). The resulting embryo will have mitochondrial DNA from the 
host, but nuclear DNA from the extinct species. The organism produced will be a genetic 
chimera, because it will contain DNA from two different species, but phenotypically it will 
closely resemble the extinct species.   
A third approach to de-extinction uses genome editing to compensate for a lack of the 
living cells needed for true cloning. Once the organism’s genome is known, genome editing can 
be used to splice synthetic copies of the organism’s genes into a close relative’s DNA until the 
genome-edited organism resembles the extinct species. For example, an elephant genome might 
be edited to create a creature resembling a mammoth (Shapiro 44-46), or the genome of the 
band-tailed pigeon might be edited to create a creature resembling a passenger pigeon (Novak, 
'The Crispr Craze Takes Fight: Adding Birds to the Crispr Zoo'). Like back-breeding, this 
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technique relies on there being a living species sufficiently closely related to the extinct species. 
It also requires an understanding of which parts of the species’ genome are important in 
determining the species’ defining characteristics. 
 
3. Are All Human Actions Natural? 
It has been argued that everything humans do is natural (Bayertz; Takala 16; Norman 2). 
Nevertheless, a coherent and useful distinction can be drawn between the natural and the 
unnatural. Consider, for example, the claim that animal breeding can be more or less natural. 
Natural methods of animal breeding require farmers to learn the conditions under which animals 
become willing and able to reproduce, and to adapt their farming techniques accordingly. Less 
natural techniques replace animals’ natural behaviour with technological interventions, such as 
artificial insemination, embryo transfer, and other practices that achieve the desired outcomes. 
Similarly, de-extinction techniques are unnatural as they involve technological interventions and 
cause changes to organisms that would not happen without those interventions. 
If the distinction between the natural and the unnatural is treated as a matter of 
technological intervention and variance from what would occur without human intervention, 
naturalness will come in degrees, and it is sometimes spoken of in this way. For example, Pence 
writes that ‘nuclear somatic cell transfer  is … one step along a spectrum of … techniques’, and 
implies that the spectrum varies from less to more technologically invasive  (194). That 
naturalness is a matter of degree will make it difficult to set sharp limits based on concerns about 
naturalness. However, this does not mean that there is no point in making the distinction 
between more or less natural practices; if it did, there would be no useful distinction between a 
bald person and someone with a full head of hair. 
Somatic cell nuclear cell transfer and gene editing require technological skills and 
equipment that are under development and not yet reliable. These techniques are unlike 
anything that occurs without the use of invasive technology. They involve a transfer of DNA 
between species that would not otherwise occur. If the ‘It’s unnatural’ objection has any force, 
it would be expected to apply to these techniques.  
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At the other end of the spectrum, back-breeding might be thought the most natural 
approach to de-extinction. Back-breeding is similar to selective breeding processes used for 
millennia to create agricultural plants and domestic animals. With the exception of genome 
sequencing and tests to check the genomes of offspring, it need not be technologically invasive. 
It only relies on organisms’ pre-existing genetic make-up and their evolutionary relationship to 
the extinct species. Once the desired genetic make-up and the animals’ existing genetic make-up 
are known, the only intervention required is restricting available reproductive partners in a 
suitable environment. If naturalness is a concern, back-breeding may raise fewer objections than 
more technologically intense processes.  
Although back-breeding is similar to common-place practices and involves less invasive 
interventions than nuclear cell transfer and gene editing, it may still be vulnerable to the ‘It’s 
unnatural’ objection. O’Connor introduces the ‘It’s unnatural’ objection when she writes, 
‘Whether these offspring [of back-breeding] would be the “real” thing depends on whether you 
would describe this sort of human tinkering as natural or unnatural, real or artificial’ (57). 
Selective breeding practices may be historically and geographically widespread, but they have 
caused harm attributed to their interference with nature as well as their consequences (D’Silva 
and Stevenson; Gamborg and Sandøe). Thus, a similarity with widespread human practices does 
not, on its own, avoid the ‘It’s unnatural’ objection. 
 
4. ‘Natural’ as a Social Construct 
To say that naturalness is a social construct is to say that what makes it true or false that 
something is ‘natural’ is a fact about a society rather than a fact about the world. If naturalness is 
a social construct, then any claim that de-extinction’s unnaturalness raises ethical concerns is a 
claim about the society and the attitude towards de-extinction held by members of that society. 
Social constructions of unnaturalness can be criticised from a cultural or political perspective. 
However, unnaturalness objections can refer to a conception of naturalness based on more than 
social attitudes.   
The concept of naturalness has been manipulated and misused through cultural 
interpretations of the objects and practices to which the word ‘natural’ applies, but this is not an 
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indication that the concept is a social construct. There is a concept of naturalness that refers to 
the state of the world rather than a cultural attitude; this concept is enough to make the 
unnaturalness objection worth evaluation. One example is the repugnant laws against interracial 
marriage in the United States that remained in force until 1967 (Pascoe). Such laws were 
commonly based on the claim that interracial marriage was unnatural. This use of the term 
‘unnatural’ stemmed from cultural and political beliefs about white supremacy. The race 
classifications at issue are nonsensical because they purport to point to natural features of the 
world that do not exist (Cavalli-Sforza; Omi). Thus, ideas about miscegenation being unnatural 
are not only racist but also scientifically false. Accounts from the discourse of the ‘unnatural’, 
clearly, can be fallacious.  
 
5. The Naturalistic Fallacy 
Arguments commit the naturalistic fallacy when they reason from a claim that something is 
natural to a conclusion that it is good (Cole et al. 48; Ball 212-13). The naturalistic fallacy is 
related to Hume’s ethical law, which argues that one cannot deduce ethical normative claims 
from descriptive accounts of what ‘is’. But assuming that what is ‘natural’ should remain, is as 
much a violation of this ethical principle as assuming that science ought to repopulate the 
threatened and the extinct. There is, in this sense, an ‘is-ought fallacy’, where a conclusion 
about what ought to be the case is derived from statements about what is the case in a reductive 
way. The argument that whatever is unnatural is bad is a version of the argument that whatever 
is natural is good, so this argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy. If the argument that the 
unnaturalness of de-extinction raises ethical problems relies on an assumption that everything 
unnatural is wrong, this objection to de-extinction can be quickly rebutted.  
The unnaturalness objection to cloning has been said to rely on an unstated assumption 
‘that everything unnatural is wrong’ (Pence 194). If Pence is right, then objections to de-
extinction practices based on an unnaturalness objection to cloning are also likely to rely on this 
assumption. The claim that ‘everything unnatural is wrong’ could be a deontic claim – that is, a 
claim that unnatural actions are wrong in themselves – and this approach is discussed below. 
However, Pence treats this as a criticism of the consequences of unnatural actions. He argues 
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that this form of reasoning is flawed, mentioning antibiotics, artificial insemination and animal 
breeding as counterexamples, that is, cases where something unnatural had good consequences 
(194). Antibiotics, artificial insemination and animal breeding have harmed humans, other 
animals, and the environment (D’Silva and Stevenson; Gamborg and Sandøe; Ventola). 
However, arguably the net effect of these technologies is good, although they would have caused 
less harm if their use had been limited in certain ways. Similarly, it would be fallacious to argue 
that naturally-evolved species have good consequences just because they are natural, and 
genetically engineered species have bad consequences just because they are unnatural.  
There are two ways that objections based on unnaturalness can avoid relying on this 
assumption. First, the ‘It's ‘unnatural’ argument risks employing the idea of the ‘unnatural’ to 
refer to the kind (or form) of action being carried out rather than referring to a state of the 
world. One can call this a ‘deontological’ approach even as a similar argument can be made from 
a virtue ethics perspective. Second, the conclusion that something is wrong because it is 
unnatural can be based on an unstated assumption that being unnatural in the relevant way will 
lead to harmful consequences, call this the consequentialist approach to the  
unnaturalness objection.  
 
6. ‘Unnaturalness’ as a Deontological Concern 
Deontological forms of the unnaturalness objection use the concept of naturalness to describe 
the intentions and attitudes that lie behind the actions, or the form of the action, not just facts 
about the interventions. For this reason, two actions that appear equivalent on a more 
consequentialist way of thinking about what it means for something to be natural could be 
regarded as importantly different. This kind of objection to the unnaturalness of a practice 
assumes that its unnaturalness affects its value. Three deontological versions of the unnaturalness 
argument are discussed below.  
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6.1 ‘Natural’ as a Thick Concept 
Sheehan argues that ‘natural’ is what philosophers call a ‘thick’ concept, that is, a concept that 
expresses both fact and value (182). Other examples of thick concepts include ‘generous’ and 
‘cruel’. To say that an act is cruel is to say both that it has negative value and that it involves a 
particular kind of action that could be described in terms of facts. Just as a cruel action is wrong 
because it is cruel, even if it has good outcomes, an act that is unnatural (in some relevant way) 
would be wrong because of the kind of action it is, rather than because of the consequences of 
the action.  
To understand Sheehan’s analysis of natural as a thick concept, imagine a world where 
wealthy athletes can undergo gene-editing to improve their speed. Arguably, such gene-editing 
would mean that the times achieved were unnatural. This would alter what it meant for 
someone to be among the world’s fastest runners. The ge-athletes would be in a class of their 
own and could no longer claim credit for their achievements relative to athletes who did not use 
gene-editing. This would, in turn, reduce the value of the achievement. Similarly, ‘[when 
runners say] that they wouldn’t take performance enhancing drugs because “they’re unnatural,” 
they are voicing resistance to a threat to the constraints within which their actions can be 
achievements’ (Holland, cited in Sheehan 185). Increasing the unnaturalness of the action alters 
the parameters of the action in ways that mean that the action cannot realise certain desirable 
values. Thus, what it is for the action to be a particular kind of action is determined by the 
conditions in which it occurs (rather than the consequences alone), and these conditions are 
sometimes evaluated in terms of naturalness, where this has connotations about both the nature 
of the conditions and their ethical status.  
Sheehan’s analysis of the unnaturalness objection suggests an interesting and innovative 
approach to considering de-extinction. On this approach, the ethical status of any de-extinction 
project will be affected by the motivations and intentions of those orchestrating the project. 
Hence, de-extinction projects would need to be evaluated individually. Ben Novak, a supporter 
of the passenger pigeon de-extinction project, implies that bringing back this species will 
decrease the rate of extinctions of other species in the areas in which it is introduced (‘The 
Passenger Pigeon: The Ecosystem Engineer of Eastern North American Forests’). Such a project 
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would be ethical inasmuch as it does not undermine its intended outcomes. Conversely, Stanley 
Temple suggests that conservation efforts are supported by people because ‘extinction is 
forever’, to use a common slogan. If de-extinction reduces people’s motivation to protect 
existing natural environments, then de-extinction projects that aim to reduce the number of 
extinct species are incoherent, and hence unethical, unless they are inextricably coupled with 
measures that protect vulnerable species and ecological systems. 
 
6.2 Integrity and Violating Species Boundaries 
The unnaturalness objection is sometimes treated as a concern that an action violates the 
integrity of a species. Objections based on a claim that an action is unnatural because it violates 
integrity can be consequentialist, that is, express concern about the consequences of violating a 
species’ integrity, or non-consequentialist, that is, claim that a species’ integrity has intrinsic 
value. Sandler refers to a non-consequentialist version of this criticism when he claims that ‘the 
unnaturalness objection to transgenic biotechnology (including deep de-extinction) depends 
upon species boundaries having ethical significance, such that creating transgenics somehow 
violates them’ (357). Sandler gives two arguments for rejecting the claim that this is even a 
prima facie reason for rejecting de-extinction. Christian Gamboeg and Peter Sandøe also refer to 
a non-consequentialist version of this argument when they argue that concern for the integrity of 
species is a poor argument against genetic modification. However, the arguments given by 
Sandler and Gamboeg and Sandøe are flawed. 
Sandler points out that genetic modification is routine in agricultural and medical 
contexts and implies that this is a reason to accept that it does not raise ethical issues (356-57). 
However, that some action is routinely carried out does not show that the action is ethical. This 
is a version of the is-ought fallacy explained in section 5; that something is the case does not 
show that it ought to be the case. Forest destruction for economic gain is routine, but this does 
not mean that it is ethical. Thus, this argument of Sandler’s against the unnaturalness objection is 
ineffective. 
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Sandler also argues that the fact that it is not considered unethical when species 
interbreed without human intervention is a reason to think that transgenic biotechnology is not 
unethical (357). It is unsurprising that species interbreeding without human intervention is not 
thought immoral; when members of different species interbreed without human intervention, 
there is no moral agent that might be acting unethically. However, when humans engage in 
practices that occur naturally, that is, without human intervention, they can be acting 
unethically. For example, wild dogs fighting is not immoral, but organising dog fights for human 
entertainment is immoral. Contexts and the agents involved affect the moral status of actions. 
Gamboeg and Sandøe argue that violating the integrity of species through genetic 
modification can be justified. They write:  
Returning to animal welfare for a moment, it might be asked how respect for integrity 
benefits the animals…. [Broiler chickens] experience leg problems as a result of over-
rapid juvenile growth….  Is it not plausible to hold that breeding for improved health 
and a reduction in susceptibility to naturally occurring diseases is an unconditionally 
good thing? (139)  
However, this response also fails to show that concerns about the integrity of species are 
unfounded. They could be well-founded and yet be prima facie moral concerns, that is, moral 
concerns that ought to be given second place to concerns about wellbeing. If this is the case, 
then species integrity ought to be protected to the extent that it can be without harming 
wellbeing.2  
 
6.3 Disgust at Frankensteinian Creations 
Concerns about de-extinction could express a disgust of Frankensteinian creations due to 
perceived abnormalities and violations of bodily integrity. For example, one research group 
investigating found that some ‘[p]articipants … selected … abnormality reasons … to explain 
their disgust at a bodily violation…’ (Russell and Giner-Sorolla 2011, cited in Wielenberg 120). 
Leon Kass describes human cloning as ‘a major violation… of our given nature as embodied, 
gendered and engendering beings – and of the social relations built on this natural ground’ and, 
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as such, to justify revulsion and disgust (‘The Wisdom of Repugnance’ 152). De-extinction 
methods include cloning and techniques that resemble cloning, so perhaps they similarly merit 
disgust. Repugnance is a useful tool for making moral decisions quickly. However, repugnance 
is only a useful tool when that repugnance is justified. If de-extinction leads to feelings of 
repugnance, those feelings are based on something. If they are based on something, then, as 
argued below, we can take the time needed to explore the reasons for those feelings of 
repugnance, and whether those reasons are justified, because de-extinction need not be rushed. 
Although disgust is an unreliable guide to wrongness (cleaning up vomit is disgusting, 
but ethical), disgust is a valuable tool for moral judgement. Robert Fischer suggests that moral 
emotions are tools for so-called ‘fast thinking’ (686). As such, disgust is a moral emotion that 
tracks certain states of the world and serves as an heuristic to guide actions (Fischer). Disgust 
and other moral emotions, such as empathy and guilt, allow people quickly to process morally 
relevant features of their environment. Shame or disgust at the thought of dog-fighting makes it 
less likely that someone will attend a dog fight on an impulse. If this analysis of moral emotions 
is correct, when agents justifiably take a state of the world to be wrong, a reaction of disgust to 
that state of the world is a reliable indicator of badness or immorality. 
Although moral emotions like disgust can be valuable when quick decisions are needed 
and for limiting impulses, deciding whether to pursue de-extinction does not require quick 
action or impulse control. Unlike the urgency with which we must stop destroying 
environments needed to sustain species at risk of becoming extinct, there is no rush to pursue 
de-extinction. The more time put into considering the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing 
de-extinction and methods of pursuing de-extinction, the more likely it is that the results will be 
positive rather than negative. If the disgust reactions some people have to genetic engineering 
and cloning point us towards an underlying moral issue, we have the time to uncover that 
underlying issue rather than use disgust itself as a guide. If no underlying moral issue is 
identified, disgust may be morally unjustifiable. 
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7. Consequentialist Versions of the Unnaturalness Objection 
In contrast to deontological objections to unnaturalness, the claim that something is unnatural 
can express concern about the effect of interfering with nature. Concerns about unnaturalness of 
this kind generally arise from fears about human ignorance about what is valuable or ignorance 
of the consequences of actions. On this view, the degree of concern about unnaturalness will 
often reflect the extent of the technological intervention. Unnaturalness becomes almost 
scientifically measurable. This approach to unnaturalness is mainly consequentialist, linking into 
concerns about the outcomes of interventions. Three versions of this form of the  
objection follow. 
 
7.1 Knock-Off Reproductions 
The ‘It’s unnatural’ objection may be an expression of dissatisfaction with the products of de-
extinction processes. In other words, it may reflect a sense of a lack of something like aesthetic 
value. Using mathematical algorithms or Adobe Stock to recreate lost paintings arguably fails to 
make up for the loss of the original artworks (Nudd; Lillemoen and Foss; Sagoff; Ricardo 35). 
Even if the recreations were indistinguishable from the originals, some people will still hold that 
they lack something important. De-extinction will produce modified versions of extinct life 
forms rather than exact replicas of what has been lost. De-extinction will create organisms that 
carry mitochondria or genetic material from species other than the target of the de-extinction 
attempt. De-mammoths will carry DNA from elephants, de-aurochs will carry DNA from 
modern cattle, and de-huia could contain genes from the saddleback or kokako (Shapiro; The 
TaurOs Programme; Campbell). De-extinction practices aim to recreate species, as well as 
individual members of a species, and de-species may also be considered reproductions rather 
than replicas. For example, de-extinction techniques that rely on DNA recovered from a small 
number of members of an extinct species are unlikely to recreate the genetic diversity that once 
existed within the population of extinct species. Even if de-extinct organisms were genetically 
identical to lost species, there would be an inevitable causal break with the original process of 
evolution. Moreover, de-extinction cannot recreate important aspects of the environments 
within which the original organisms lived, including epigenetic influences, chemical nutrients, 
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bacteria and symbiotic flora. If research teams in Beijing and California recreate the moa that 
once roamed New Zealand forests, these de-moa will not be a creation of the same kind as the 
moa produced through evolution (Iorns). These creatures will have been produced through a 
process unlike evolution, in a radically different an environment, with differing epigenetic 
conditions and bacterial symbionts.3 In this way, they will resemble reproductions of artworks. 
Recreated versions of species that became extinct decades or centuries ago are, in this  
sense, reproductions.4 
Even though species recreated through de-extinction are reproductions, their recreation 
may have advantages. Reproductions of artworks do not have the same value as originals, but it 
does not follow that reproductions are valueless or even that they have less value than original 
artworks. Reproductions of artworks enrich people’s lives and encourage people to learn more 
about art, artists and history. If this were not the case, presumably authors Martin Bailey, 
Laurence Anholt, and James Mayhew among others, would not include reproductions of Van 
Gogh’s Sunflowers in their books, and prints of Van Gogh’s Sunflowers would not be sold in art 
galleries. Reproductions of extinct species may also enrich people’s lives and encourage people 
to learn more about flora and fauna, ecological systems and environmental ethics. 
For those who value the tie to evolution, de-moa will be as much a reminder of what 
can be lost through a failure to value and protect organisms, species and ecological systems as 
they are a reminder of human ingenuity, values and hard work. To the extent that people care 
about such losses, de-moa could thus serve as a reminder to think before acting in ways that may 
be destructive. Thus, any perceived unnaturalness stemming from a break in the evolutionary 
chain between extinct organisms and their de-counterparts may be compensated for by a 
reduction in future extinctions due to increased care for the environment. 
 
7.2 Fear of Harm from Frankensteinian Creations 
The unnaturalness objection may be partly grounded in a concern that the process of de-
extinction will violate the integrity of the organisms or ecological systems in a way that 
accidentally destroys the environment. Chapman, for example, suggests that ‘[unnaturalness is] a 
THE UNNATURALNESS OBJECTION TO DE-EXTINCTION 
 
53 
way of talking about radical uncertainty, or ignorance about the effects of a new technology’. 
The history of extinction includes many cases where human intervention destroyed a species 
(Diamond, Ashmole and Purves). This has occurred even when the goal of the intervention was 
to improve the environment. The New Zealand Acclimatisation Society’s work in the nineteenth 
century was intended to increase diversity, not threaten native species (Druett 88-96). People 
quickly realised that good intentions and enthusiasm coupled with ignorance can lead to  
bad consequences:  
‘It is a matter for regret,’ said Mr Bathgate to the Otago Institute in 1897, ‘that the zeal 
of the earlier acclimatisers was greater than their knowledge, and that mistakes were 
made by them fraught with evil results of a far-reaching and permanent nature. Due 
care and consideration,’ he protested, ‘would have prevented the introduction of 
several undesirable immigrants, which now, like the poor, are always with us.’ ‘It is 
time drastic steps,’ said Mr Poppelwell to the New Zealand Science Congress in 1929, 
‘were taken to cope with the evil being done to our fauna and flora by foreign 
importations.’ (Druett 99) 
Undoing harms caused by releasing a new species into an environment is much harder than 
releasing them. Even with careful research, the consequences of releasing de-species into the 
environment will be uncertain. 
Placing de-animals in settings other than zoos or quarantined reserves will need to be 
done with extreme caution. Given the risks associated with introducing new species into an 
environment, the decision about whether to recreate a lost species should be based on well-
reasoned expectations that recreating the species will be of value, whether to humans, other 
non-human animals, existing species or ecological systems. Knowledge and protocols from the 
development and spread of biological controls and genetically modified organisms can be used to 
limit harm from organisms produced through de-extinction. We already know some things 
about the likelihood that various species of flora and fauna will undermine certain ecological 
systems. Objections based on a fear from unnatural creations have merit, but with care risks can 
be mitigated. 
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7.3 Unnatural Actions and Power Relations   
Technologically intense processes tend to increase the autonomy of some people, but decrease 
the autonomy of others (Chapman; Lewis 718-30). As C.S. Lewis writes, ‘what we call Man’s 
power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature 
as its instrument’ (719). Thus, concern about naturalness dovetails with concern about justice. 
No current regulations or codes compel, or even encourage, those working on de-extinction 
projects to act in ways that consider the good of communities affected by their actions. This will 
not be an issue for de-extinction projects on flora and fauna that have been extinct for millennia, 
because no living cultural group will have close ties to such species. However, it will be an issue 
for some species that recently became extinct. For example, the de-extinction of moa is being 
pursued outside of New Zealand without any involvement of Maori who have the closest 
cultural ties to moa (Iorns). Ignoring the relationship between communities with cultural ties to 
certain flora and fauna is a problem that occurs in other areas, such as captive breeding 
programs. Animal breeding advocates, institutions and environmental agencies often fail to 
mention this issue, but this does not make it less important.5  
If this matters, and surely it does, there are ways of ensuring that cultural ties to flora 
and fauna are recognised by de-extinction projects. On one sense of the word ‘natural’, working 
at a more natural level would involve working in locations where the species originated and 
where similar species still exist. For example, if the de-extinction of Australian animals like the 
Tasmanian Tiger is based in Southern Australia, this will make it easier to involve local 
Aboriginal communities in the project. Although consultation may occur voluntarily, ethical de-
extinction is likely to require codes or regulations to ensure that it proceeds in a way that 
respects the cultural interests of those with ties to particular species. State level policies that 
facilitate the involvement of those with a cultural connection to the species are likely to be 
needed. International regulations will also need to be instituted to control de-extinction 
programmes for flora and fauna endemic to one country in different countries. Such regulations 
will be particularly important to support indigenous people in colonised countries, who are  
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likely to already have reduced autonomy, and indigenous people in developing countries, where  
the socio-economic situation may weaken their ability to control the treatment of valued local 
flora and fauna. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Objections based on the unnaturalness of a proposed action or consequence cannot always be 
dismissed on the grounds that they rely on an assumption that everything that is unnatural is bad. 
Deontological arguments can use a thick concept of ‘natural’ to avoid the naturalistic fallacy. 
Consequentialists can avoid the naturalistic fallacy by demonstrating that certain consequences 
are bad. However, none of the arguments against de-extinction discussed here demonstrate that 
the various ways in which de-extinction or de-extinction processes are unnatural give good 
reason to prohibit de-extinction.  
At its most convincing, the unnaturalness objection to de-extinction provides a prima 
facie objection to de-extinction. Introducing what will, in a sense, be new species into an 
environment is risky, and those who control technologies that manipulate nature can harm those 
with less technological power whose wellbeing is tied to nature. Whether these objections 
demonstrate that the pursuit of de-extinction should be halted or limited will depend on 
whether these concerns are outweighed by benefits from de-extinction or can be dealt with by 
modifying or limiting the ways in which de-extinction is pursued. For the de-extinction of any 
species to be ethical, it is important that researchers consider the ways in which de-extinction 
practices may destroy existing ecological systems or species or harm cultural relationships with 
nature, together with the welfare of members of the de-species. 
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Notes 
 
1 See Douglas Campbell (2016) for an argument that the importance of this difference has been 
exaggerated.  
2 Similarly, international organisations’ statements about non-therapeutic genetic modification in 
humans suggest that there are prima facie reasons not to carry out genetic modification. Such 
statements have preserving or respecting human dignity as a central aim, and conclude that 
genetic engineering of humans is only acceptable for reducing suffering or for therapeutic 
purposes. That is, genetic modification has disvalue because it undermines dignity, but is 
justifiable when it reduces harms not readily treated in other ways. See, for example, 
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights and the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine. 
3 Symbiotic bacteria evolve alongside their hosts and, among other things, are known to protect 
organisms against a variety of threats, affect the way that animals digest food, and affect chemical 
signals, including reproductive signalling, in some organisms (Goodwin et al.; Dubilier, Bergin 
and Lott; Sachs, Skophammer and Regus; Lundgren and Lehman; Flórez et al.). 
4 Cf Douglas Campbell in this volume.  
5 Webpages for captive breeding programs tend not to mention cultural groups with ties to the 
animals bred in zoos. However, there are exceptions. Concern for human-animal relationships 
among indigenous people is shown in work by institutions, such as the CSIRO in Australia 
(Burbidge, Woinarski and Harrison), and work by individuals, such as white lion conservationist 
Linda Tucker (Tucker and Harvey).  
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